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记录：Charlie Munger: Daily Journal Annual Meeting 2018，2018年2月25日星期日。

听明白大师的话，这并不容易。

【富国银行是“例外”的银行？什么是例外？银行也是一个危险的投资，只有少数例外，伯克希尔在挑选例外。】 银行业是一项非常奇特的业务。And so banking is a dangerous place to invest and there are a few exceptions. And Berkshire has tried to (pick) the exceptions as best it could. And I haven’t had any more to say on that subject except, I’m sure I’m right. 所以银行业务是一个危险的投资地点，除少数例外。伯克希尔试图尽可能地（挑选）例外。除此之外，我没有更多的话要说，但我确定我是对的。

【“fish where the fish are”：好生意最重要。 】钓鱼的第一条规则是“在鱼多的地方钓鱼”，而钓鱼的第二条规则是“不要忘记第一条规则”。并且在投资时也是如此。 有些地方有很多鱼，你不需要那么好的渔民做得很好。 其他地方都是如此重要，以至于无论你是多么优秀的渔民，你都不会做得很好。 而在我们现在生活的世界里，很多地方都属于第二类。

【迄今为止最公平的收费公式：我也整个试试？】 巴菲特的计算公式是他以25％的利润抽成，每年超过6％并且高水位。所以如果投资者没有拿到6％，巴菲特就一无所获。这就是Mohnish的系统。

【100万美元，可以回报50％？何必费劲。】 And for me it’s hard. And for Berkshire it’s hard. The minute you get bigger sums, I think it starts getting difficult.（注：结合上下文，小资本高回报是极其极其精明的人才能做到的事。何必费劲呐？）

【保险：坚决回避】 But basically the insurance business is not some cinch easy way to make money. There’s a lot of danger and trouble in the insurance business and its more and more competitive all the time now as we’re sitting here. 但基本上保险业务不是赚钱的简单方法。在我们坐在这里的时候，保险业务中存在很多危险和麻烦，而且现在它越来越竞争激烈。

【保证金交易：绝对不碰】 Charlie: Well of course it’s dangerous when you have a margin account because the person whose giving you credit can wipe you out at the bottom tick just because he feels nervous. 查理：当然，如果你有保证金账户，这是很危险的，因为给予你信用的人可能会因为他感到紧张而在底部剔除掉你。

【投资管理的激励结构】 您为客户做得更好的几率有多大？那么收取这些费用的平均实体，客户做得很好的可能性相当差。这就是沃伦赢得对冲基金的赌注的原因。And of course the high fees will just kill you. 当然，高额费用将会杀死你。

【指数投资：没问题。】I think it’ll keep running a long time forward, and I think it’ll work pretty well for a long time. 我认为它会持续很长一段时间，我认为它很长一段时间会工作得很好。

【我认为大多数报纸都将会灭亡。 这只是一个什么时候的问题。】

【Daily Journal 持有一大堆证券是偶然的。】

【投资BYD是真正的风险投资类型】

【投资铁路公司与航空企业：】Certainly it’s ok to change your mind when the facts change. 当事实发生变化时，当然可以改变主意。

【比特币：看都别看。】但比特币是有毒的毒药。而中国政府正在加紧实施这一做法是正确的，我国政府对此的更加宽松的态度是错误的。

**** 以下摘要 *****

【我认为大多数报纸都将会灭亡。 这只是一个什么时候的问题。】

我认为大多数报纸都将会灭亡。 这只是一个什么时候的问题。 我的意思是他们都会死。 你知道纽约时报会继续，因为人们会在机场支付5美元。 所以会有一些幸存者，但总的来说报业生意不好。 伯克希尔哈撒韦拥有很多这样的产品。 并购买它们，我们计算出一定的自然下降率，此后利润将变为零。（链接）我们低估了下降的速度。它比我们想象的要快。

Most newspapers by the way I think are going to perish. It’s just a question of when. I mean they’re all going to die. You know the New York Times will continue because people will pay $5 for it in an airport. So there will be a few survivors, but by and large the newspaper business is not doing well. Berkshire Hathaway owns a lot of them. And buying them we figured on a certain natural decline rate after which the profits would go to zero. (link) We underestimated the rate of decline. It’s going faster than we thought.

【Daily Journal 持有一大堆证券是偶然的。】

We have a big bundle of securities by accident when we made a lot of money out of the foreclosure boom. And it just happened to come in about the time when the market hit bottom. And of course we look like a genius now because we put the money into securities because we preferred them to holding cash.

当我们从止赎热潮中赚了很多钱时，我们有一大堆证券是偶然的。而且恰好在市场触底时出现。当然，我们现在看起来像是一个天才，因为我们把这笔钱存入证券，因为我们倾向于持有现金。

【投资BYD是真正的风险投资类型】

That with Berkshire Hathaway and the Munger family money that went into it was really a venture capital type play even though it was in the public market. 伯克希尔哈撒韦公司和蒙格家族资金进入这个市场后，即使是在公开市场上，也是真正的风险投资类型。

So we have an interesting venture capital type business, and BYD has gone into a business they were never in before, which is monorails. And they are selling monorails like you can’t believe. Boom-diddy, boom-diddy, boom to whole cities in China. And some even in other countries. 所以我们有一个有趣的风险投资类型的业务，比亚迪进入了一个他们从未在之前的业务，这是单轨。他们正在销售你不能相信的单轨电车。轰轰烈烈，热潮汹涌，轰轰烈烈的中国城市。有些甚至在其他国家。

The Wells Fargo position is interesting, and I know I’ll get questions about that, so I’ll answer them again in advance. (laughter) Of course Wells Fargo had incentive systems that were too strong in the wrong direction. And of course they were too slow in reacting properly to bad news when it came. Practically everybody makes those mistakes. (Note: See Question 16) I think around here we make fewer than others, but we still make them in the same direction. I think

Wells Fargo will end up better off for having made those mistakes. 当然，富国银行的激励体系在错误的方向上过于强大。当然，它们在对坏消息作出正确反应时速度太慢。几乎每个人都犯这些错误。我认为在这里我们比别人少，但我们仍然在同一个方向。我认为富国银行最终会因为犯了这些错误而变得更好。

Any bank can make a lot of money by making a bunch of gamier loans at higher interest rates or abusing their customers with very aggressive treatments. And of course banks really shouldn’t do that. And I think as a result of all the trouble, Wells Fargo’s customers are going to be better off (for) this event, and I think it’s time for the regulators to let up on Wells Fargo. They’ve learned. I can’t think of anything else that deserves a lot of comment in our basic businesses. 任何一家银行都可以通过以更高的利率提供一系列高额贷款或以非常积极的治疗方式滥用其客户，从而赚取大量资金。当然，银行真的不应该那样做。而且我认为，由于所有的麻烦，富国银行的客户将会变得更好，因此我认为现在是监管机构放弃富国银行的时候了。他们学到了。我想不出任何其他值得我们基本业务评论很多的东西。

Charlie: Well, banking is a very peculiar business. The temptations that come to a banking CEO are way…the temptations to do something stupid are way greater in banking than they are in most businesses. Therefore it’s a dangerous place to invest because there are a lot of way in banking to make the near term future look good by taking risks you really shouldn’t take for the sake of the long-term future. 查理：那么，银行业是一项非常奇特的业务。银行业首席执行官的诱惑是方式......在银行业中做愚蠢行为的诱惑远大于大多数企业。因此，这是一个危险的投资地点，因为银行业有很多方法可以通过承担你不应该为了长期未来而冒险的短期未来。

And so banking is a dangerous place to invest and there are a few exceptions. And Berkshire has tried to (pick) the exceptions as best it could. And I haven’t had any more to say on that subject except, I’m sure I’m right. 所以银行业务是一个危险的投资地点，除少数例外。伯克希尔试图尽可能地（挑选）例外。除此之外，我没有更多的话要说，但我确定我是对的。

【投资管理的激励结构】 您为客户做得更好的几率有多大？那么收取这些费用的平均实体，客户做得很好的可能性相当差。这就是沃伦赢得对冲基金的赌注的原因。And of course the high fees will just kill you. 当然，高额费用将会杀死你。

I think the incentive structure in investment management is very interesting. If you look at the people who have a ton of money from the past, like say the Massachusetts Investor Trust (link) or something like that, which pioneered Mutual Fund investing in the early days after Mutual Funds were allowed. 我认为投资管理的激励结构非常有趣。 如果你看看过去有很多钱的人，比如说说马萨诸塞州投资者信托基金（链接）或类似的东西，那么在共同基金被允许之后的领先者。

It was certainly a respectable and honorable place. But once it gets to be $700 billion or whatever it is, and hires a lot of young men and has a big staff and so forth…and young women too…and spreads its investment over 50 securities at least, the chances that it’s going to outperform the S&P average really shrinks to about zero. 这当然是一个可敬的和光荣的地方。但一旦达到7000亿美元或者其他任何事情，雇用很多年轻人，拥有庞大的员工等等......以及年轻女性......并且至少将投资扩展到50个证券，那么这个机会将会跑赢标普平均价格实际收缩至零。

And of course they wondered what we’ll keep paying, whatever number of basis points Massachusetts Investor Trust’s management operation charges for the long-term, and they may feel under pressure and that their world is threatened. 当然，他们想知道我们会一直支付多少基点马萨诸塞州投资者信托公司的长期管理运营费用，他们可能会感到压力和他们的世界受到威胁。

（备注：现代概念上的共同基金，其历史可以追溯到1924年。那一年在美国的波士顿，Massachusetts Investors’ Trust被发起建立。该基金于1928年上市，并最终成为著名的MFS Investment Management。State Street被指定为该基金的托管人。）

What are your chances of doing better for your clients? Well the average entity that charges those fees, the chances the clients will do well is pretty poor. That’s the reason Warren won that bet against the hedge funds. Where he bet on the S&P averages and they bet on carefully selected bunch of geniuses charging very high fees. And of course the high fees will just kill you. 您为客户做得更好的几率有多大？那么收取这些费用的平均实体，客户做得很好的可能性相当差。这就是沃伦赢得对冲基金的赌注的原因。他在标准普尔平均投注点上下注，他们赌注精心挑选的一些天才收取非常高的费用。 当然，高额费用将会杀死你。

It’s so hard in a competitive world to get big advantages just buying securities, particularly when you’re doing it by the billion, and then you add the burden of very high fees and think that by working hard and reading a lot of sell-side research and so forth, that you’re going to do well. It’s delusional. It’s not good to face the world in a delusional way. 在一个竞争激烈的世界里，要想获得巨大的优势，比如购买证券是非常困难的，特别是当你以十亿美元的价格购买证券时，那么你会增加很高的费用，并认为通过努力工作和阅读大量的卖方研究等等，你会做得很好。这是妄想。以妄想的方式面对世界是不好的。

And I don’t think, when Berkshire came up, we had an easier world than you people are facing this point forward, and I don’t think you’re going to get the kind of results we got by just doing what we did. That’s not to say what we did and the attitudes that we had are obsolete or won’t be useful, it’s just that their prospects are worse. 我不认为，当伯克希尔出现时，我们的世界比人们面对这一点时更容易一些，而且我不认为只要做我们所做的就可以得到我们得到的那种结果。这并不是说我们做了什么，我们的态度已经过时或不会有用，只是它们的前景更糟。

There’s a rule of fishing that’s a very good rule. The first rule of fishing is “fish where the fish are”, and the second rule of fishing is “don’t forget rule number one.” And in investing it’s the same thing. Some places have lots of fish and you don’t have to be that good a fisherman to do pretty well. Other places are so heavily fished that no matter how good a fisherman you are, you aren’t going to do very well. And in the world we’re living in now, an awful lot of places are in the second category. 有一条钓鱼规则是一条很好的规则。钓鱼的第一条规则是“在鱼多的地方钓鱼”，而钓鱼的第二条规则是“不要忘记第一条规则”。并且在投资时也是如此。有些地方有很多鱼，你不需要那么好的渔民做得很好。其他地方都是如此重要，以至于无论你是多么优秀的渔民，你都不会做得很好。而在我们现在生活的世界里，很多地方都属于第二类。

I don’t think that should discourage anyone. I mean life’s a long game, and there are easy stretches and hard stretches and good opportunities and bad opportunities. The right way to go at life is to take it as it comes and do the best you can. And if you live to an old age, you’ll get your share of good opportunities. It may be two to a life time, that may be your full share. But if you seize one of the two, you’ll be alright. Well with that pontification done, I’ll take questions. 我认为这不应该阻止任何人。我的意思是生命是一场漫长的比赛，并且很容易延伸，艰难的延伸和良好的机会以及糟糕的机会。走向人生的正确途径就是尽其所能，尽力而为。如果你活到了老年，你会得到你的好机会。这可能是两个人的一生，这可能是你的全部份额。但是如果你抓住其中一个，你会没事的。那么完成了这个交涉，我会提出问题。

Peter Kaufman: I’ll let Charlie answer that because he can describe to you what he thinks is the most fair fee formula that ever existed and that’s the formula in Warren Buffett’s original partnership. 彼得考夫曼：我会让查理回答这个问题，因为他可以向你描述他认为是迄今为止最公平的收费公式，这就是沃伦巴菲特最初的合伙公式。

Charlie: Yeah, Buffett copied that from Graham. And Mohnish Pabrai is probably here…is Mohnish here? Stand up and wave to them Mohnish. This man uses the Buffett formula, and always has, he just copied it. And Mohnish has just completed 10 years…where he was making up for a high water-mark. 查理：是的，巴菲特抄袭了格雷厄姆。 Mohnish Pabrai可能在这里...... Mohnish在这里？站起来向他们挥手Mohnish。这个人使用巴菲特公式，并且总是有，他只是复制了它。而Mohnish刚刚完成了10年......他正在弥补高水位。

The Buffett formula was that he took 25% of the profits over 6% per annum with a high water mark. So if the investor didn’t get 6%, Buffett would get nothing. And that’s Mohnish’s system. And I like that system, but it’s like many things that I like and I think should spread, we get like almost no successes spreading that system. It’s too hard. 巴菲特的计算公式是他以25％的利润抽成，每年超过6％并且高水位。所以如果投资者没有拿到6％，巴菲特就一无所获。这就是Mohnish的系统。我喜欢那个系统，但是它像我喜欢的许多东西，我认为应该传播，我们几乎没有传播这个系统的成功。太难了。

Question 21: In 1999, Warren Buffett said that he could return 50% if he ran $1 million. Give what you said about the investment landscape today being more difficult, what do you think that number would be today? 问题21：1999年，沃伦巴菲特说如果他跑100万美元，他可以回报50％。说出你对今天投资环境的看法更加困难，你认为今天的数字会是多少？

I do think a person with a lot of shrewdness, working with a small amount of capital, can probably earn high returns on capital even today. However that is not my personal problem at the moment. And for me it’s hard. And for Berkshire it’s hard. 我认为，即使在今天，一个有着很多精明的人，用少量资本工作，也可能获得高额资本回报。然而那不是我目前的个人问题。对我而言，这很难。对于伯克希尔来说很难。

Generally speaking, I would say, if you’re shrewd enough with small sums of money, I think you can compound pretty well. The minute you get bigger sums, I think it starts getting difficult. 一般来说，我会说，如果你足够精明，我认为你可以复合得很好。一旦你得到更多的钱，我认为它开始变得困难。

Charlie: Well obviously there was a little leverage buried in the Berkshire numbers. Obviously the insurance business provided some of that. It’s not over-whelming in its consequences. There were years when it was helping. There were years when Ajit made so much money that it was almost embarrassing. And then he’d give the money to Warren and Warren would make 20% on the money. So there were some years when some remarkable synergies between the insurance business and Berkshire Hathaway. 查理：很明显，伯克希尔数据中有一点小小的影响力。很显然，保险业提供了其中的一部分。它的后果并不是过度激烈。有几年它在帮忙。有几年Ajit赚了这么多钱，几乎让人尴尬。然后他会把钱交给沃伦，而沃伦会拿到20％的钱。因此，在保险业务与伯克希尔哈撒韦之间出现一些显着的协同效应之前有几年。

But basically the insurance business is not some cinch easy way to make money. There’s a lot of danger and trouble in the insurance business and its more and more competitive all the time now as we’re sitting here. 但基本上保险业务不是赚钱的简单方法。在我们坐在这里的时候，保险业务中存在很多危险和麻烦，而且现在它越来越竞争激烈。

Berkshire succeeded because there were very few big errors…there were like no big errors, really big. (link) And there were a considerable number of successes. All of which would have been much harder to get under present conditions than they were at the time we got the results. And there are very few companies that have compounded at 19% per annum for fifty years. It’s (a weird) in net worth. That is very peculiar. I wouldn’t count on that happening again soon. It certainly won’t happen at the Daily Journal. 伯克希尔成功了，因为几乎没有什么大错误......没有大错误，真的很大。（链接）还有相当多的成功。在目前的情况下，所有这些要比我们得到结果的时候要困难得多。而且几乎没有几家公司每五年以19％的年复合成本。这是一个（奇怪的）身家。这是非常奇特的。我不会指望很快再发生。这当然不会发生在“日报”上。

Neiderhoffer (link 1, 2) was just wiped out by the VIX, and that’s the second time he’s been wiped out. And he’s a very talented man. Neiderhoffer was famous at Harvard. His name became a verb. Neiderhoffer（链接1，2）刚刚被VIX消灭了，这是他第二次被消灭。而且他是一个非常有才华的人。 Neiderhoffer在哈佛闻名。他的名字成了一个动词。

But when you’re already rich, it’s insane. Why would you risk what you have and need in order to get what you don’t have and don’t need? It really is stupid. 但是当你已经富有时，这是疯狂的。为什么你会冒你拥有和需要的东西来获得你没有的和不需要的东西？这真的很愚蠢。

（注：Victor Niederhoffer：

1997年损失 [ 编辑 ]

1997年，Niederhoffer投资公司没有找到很多投资机会，并且把大部分资金归还给乔治索罗斯这样的客户，后来开始将剩下的1亿美元投资于尼德霍夫后来承认自己没有太多专业知识的地区。 [19]尼德霍夫决定购买在亚洲金融危机中大幅下跌的泰国银行股，他认为泰国政府不会允许这些公司停业。 1997年10月27日，该投资导致的损失加上道琼斯工业平均指数 （指数历史上迄今为止第八[20]大幅下跌）的单日下跌554点（7.2％），迫使Niederhoffer Investments关闭它的大门。 尼德霍夫后来向伊利诺伊州北部地区的美国地区法院提起诉讼，指控芝加哥商品交易所交易期权，他指控该地板交易商勾结当天推低市场，迫使他离开其职位。当时的交易商称，瑞富可能对Niederhoffer的亏损负责多达3500万美元。 [21]

新基金 [ 编辑 ]

自从1997年关闭他的基金以来，他在抵押了他的房子并出售他的古董银收藏品之后，于1998年再次开始为自己的账户交易。 这个原始基金被称为温布尔登基金，这个名字反映了他对网球的热爱。他于2002年2月与斗牛士基金会开始为离岸客户管理资金。 Niederhoffer采用专有程序来预测使用多元时间序列分析的短期移动。从2001年开始的五年期间，尼德霍夫的基金每年返还50％（复合）。他在这个时期最糟糕的一年是2004年，返回40％。在2005年，他回报了56.2％（如电子财经新闻报道）。 2006年4月6日，行业集团MarHedge在2004年和2005年的两年中授予Matador Fund Ltd.和曼彻斯特交易公司两个基金，Niederhoffer管理的商品交易顾问（CTA）最佳表现奖。

然而，Niederhoffer的资金在2007年的次级抵押贷款金融危机中陷入困境 ，斗牛士基金在价值下跌超过75％后于2007年9月关闭。 [23] [24]

从2000年到2003年，尼德霍夫与金融作家劳雷尔肯纳合作撰写了CNBC MoneyCentral市场每周专栏。 [25]他和肯纳在1997年出版的“投机者教育”一书中讲述了实践投机（John Wiley＆Sons，2003年2月），尼德霍夫的生平故事以及他吸取的教训。）

【投资铁路公司与航空企业：】Certainly it’s ok to change your mind when the facts change. 当事实发生变化时，当然可以改变主意。

Charlie: Well, we did change our mind. For a long time, Warren and I (painted over) the railroad because there were too many of them, and it was too competitive, and union rules were too crazy. They were lousy investments for about 75 years. 查理：嗯，我们确实改变了主意。很长一段时间，沃伦和我（画在）铁路，因为它们太多了，而且它太竞争了，工会规则太疯狂了。在大约75年的时间里，这些投资都很糟糕。

And then they finally…the world changed and they double decked all the trains and they got down to four big rail systems in all the United States in terms of freight and all of a sudden we liked railroads. It took about 75 years. Warren and I never looked at railroads for about 50 years, and then we bought one. (link) 然后他们终于......世界发生了变化，他们将所有的列车都双重装上了，并且在货运方面他们到达了美国所有的四大铁路系统，而我们突然之间就喜欢铁路。花了大约75年。沃伦和我从来没有看过铁路大约50年，然后我们买了一辆。

Now airlines, Warren use to joke about them. He’d say that the investing class would have done better if the Wright Brothers would never have invented flight. But given the conditions that were present when the stock was purchased and given the conditions of Berkshire Hathaway where it was drowning in money, we thought it was ok to buy a bunch of airline stocks. What more can I say? Certainly it’s ok to change your mind when the facts change. And to some extent the facts had changed, and to some extent they haven’t. It is harder to create the little competing airlines than it was. And the industry has maybe learned something. I hope it works better, but I don’t think its…I think the chances of us buying airlines and holding them for 100 years is going to work that well. I think that’s pretty low. 现在航空公司，沃伦用它来开玩笑。如果赖特兄弟永远不会发明飞行，他会说投资班会做得更好。 但考虑到股票被购买时存在的条件，并且考虑到伯克希尔哈撒韦的资金淹没条件，我们认为可以买一堆航空股。 我还能说什么？ 当事实发生变化时，当然可以改变主意。 事实在一定程度上已经发生了变化，并且在某种程度上它们没有。创造竞争激烈的航空公司比以前更难。这个行业也许可以学到一些东西。我希望它运作得更好，但我不认为它......我认为我们购买航空公司并将它们持续100年的机会将会很好地发挥作用。我认为这很低。

Charlie: I think that a lot of people who are in the business of selling investment advice, hate the fact that the indexes have been outperforming them. And of course, they can’t say, “I hate it, because it’s ruining my life.” But they say, “I hate it because it’s too concentrated.” Well the index contains 75% of the market capitalization. It’s hardly so small. Index investing will work for quite a while when it’s so broad. I don’t think it’s ruining the world or anything like that. It is peculiar that we lived a long time without this. I think it’ll keep running a long time forward, and I think it’ll work pretty well for a long time. And I suspect most money-managers just hate it. It’s making their life hard. But you see I don’t mind if people are having a hard life. 查理：我认为很多从事出售投资建议业务的人都讨厌这些指数超过他们的事实。当然，他们不能说：“我讨厌它，因为它毁了我的生活。”但他们说，“我讨厌它，因为它太浓了。”那么指数包含75％的市值。它几乎没有那么小。指数投资如此广泛，将会持续相当长一段时间。我不认为这会破坏世界或类似的东西。没有这个，我们生活了很久很奇特。我认为它会持续很长一段时间，我认为它很长一段时间会工作得很好。我怀疑大多数资金管理者只是讨厌它。这让他们的生活变得艰难。但你看我不介意人们是否过着艰苦的生活。

【比特币：看都别看。】但比特币是有毒的毒药。而中国政府正在加紧实施这一做法是正确的，我国政府对此的更加宽松的态度是错误的。

But Bitcoin is noxious poison. Partly they love it because the computer science is quite intriguing to people with mathematical brains. It’s quite a feat what they’ve done as a matter of pure computer science. But, you know, I’m sure you can get terribly good at torture if you spend a lot of time at it. (laughter) It’s not a good development. And the government of China which is stepping on it pretty hard is right and our government’s more lax approach to it is wrong. The right answer to stuff like that is to step on it hard, and it’s the government’s job. 但比特币是有毒的毒药。部分他们喜欢它，因为计算机科学对数学大脑的人来说非常有趣。这是他们在纯粹的计算机科学方面所做的伟大成就。但是，你知道，如果你花很多时间在这里，我相信你可以非常善良地忍受酷刑。（笑）这不是一个好的发展。而中国政府正在加紧实施这一做法是正确的，我国政府对此的更加宽松的态度是错误的。像这样的东西的正确答案就是加紧努力，这是政府的工作。

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