“Red”和“Redness”

（读Moran的现象学导论读到胡塞尔的一段，发现这里可以搞点“分析哲学和现象学的对话”。。。刚在现象学组发过，到维组再来试试。。。估计小组里能懂德语的不多，所以不贴德语了。。。）

● 胡塞尔：

　　我们眼前有一个红色的对象。但这个红色的对象并不是红的类。这个具体对象也并不把那个类作为一个“心理性的”或“形而上学的”部分包含在自身之中。这个部分，即这个非独立的红色之成分，与那具体的整个对象一样，是一个个体性的东西，是一个此时此地的东西，是一个随那具体的整个对象出现和消失的东西，而且它在不同的红色对象中是同样的，而不是同一的。然而“红性”，却是一个观念性的统一体，而谈论它的出现和消失是荒谬的。前面所说的那个部分[即非独立的红色之成分]不是红性，而是红性之一个例。而正如一般性对象与个体性对象之有别，把握两种对象的行为之间亦有别。（中译从倪梁康来，根据英译有调整）

　A red object stands before us, but this red object is not the Species Red. Nor does the concrete object contain the Species as a “psychological” or “metaphysical” part. The part, the independent moment of red (dies unselbst?ndige Rotmoment), is, like the concrete whole object, something individual, something here and now, something which arises and vanishes with the concrete whole object, and which is like, not identical, in different objects. Redness, however, is an ideal unity (eine ideale Einheit), in regard to which it is absurd to speak of coming into being or passing away. The part (moment) red is not redness, but an instance of Redness (ein Einzelfall von R?te). And, as universal objects differ from singular ones, so, too, do our acts of apprehending them.（英译来自Findlay）

(Prol. § 39, p. 149; Hua XVIII 135)

● 维特根斯坦：

　　57．“红色的东西可以被毁灭，但红色是无法被毁灭的，因此‘红色’一词的含义不依赖于某种红色的东西的存在。”——诚然，说红这种颜色（不是说红颜料）被撕碎或踩碎是没有意义的。但是我们不也说“红色在消褪”吗，不要总固执己见，以为即使再没有红色的东西存在，我们总能在心里唤起红色。那就等于你要说：那总会有产生红色火焰的化学反应呀。——你要是再也记不起这种颜色了，情况又怎样呢？－我们忘记了具有这个名称的是何种颜色，这个名称就对我们失去了含义；即，我们不再能用它来进行某种语言游戏了。这种情形就好比是：这范型曾是我们语言的一种工具，而它现在沦失了。

　　58．“我将把‘名称’只用来称谓不能在‘Ｘ存在’这样的句式中出现的东西。——从而就不可以说‘红色存在’，因为假如没有红色，就根本不能谈论它。”——更正当的说法是：如果“Ｘ存在”说的不过是：“Ｘ”有含义，——那么它就不是关于Ｘ的命题，而是关于我们语言使用的命题，即关于使用“Ｘ”一词的命题。

　　我们说“红色存在”这话没什么意义，这时我们看上去像在谈论关于红色的本性似的。红色恰恰“自在自为”地存在。同样的想法——这是关于红色的形而上学命题——在我们说“红色是无时间性的”这话里也表达出来，也许用“不可毁灭”这个词表达得更加强烈。

　　其实我们真正想要的只是把“红色存在”看作“红色‘一词具有含义”这样一个命题。也许更正当的说法是：把“红色不存在”看作一‘红色’没有含义“。我们并不想说：这句话说出了这个意思，而是说：假使它有含义，那它一定说的是这个意思。但这个说法由于企图说出这个意思而自相矛盾——恰因为红色“自在自为”地存在。矛盾只是在于这个命题看起来是说颜色的，其实应该是在说“红色”一词的用法。——但在现实中，我们挺习惯说某种颜色存在；这相当于说某种有这个颜色的东西存在。第一种说法同第二种说法同样精确；尤其所说的“有颜色的东西”不是一个物体。（中译来自陈嘉映本）

　57. "Something red can be destroyed, but red cannot be destroyed, and that is why the meaning of the word 'red' is independent of the existence of a red thing."—Certainly it makes no sense to say that the colour red is torn up or pounded to bits. But don't we say "The red is vanishing"? And don't clutch at the idea of our always being able to bring red before our mind's eye even when there is nothing red any more. That is just as if you chose to say that there would still always be a chemical reaction producing a red flame.—For suppose you cannot remember the colour any more?—When we forget which colour this is the name of, it loses its meaning for us; that is, we are no longer able to play a particular language-game with it. And the situation then is comparable with that in which we have lost a paradigm which was an instrument of our language,

　58. "I want to restrict the term 'name' to what cannot occur in the combination 'X exists'.—Thus one cannot say 'Red exists', because if there were no red it could not be spoken of at all."—Better: If "X exists" is meant simply to say: "X" has a meaning,—then it is not a proposition which treats of X, but a proposition about our use of language, that is, about the use of the word "X".
　It looks to us as if we were saying something about the nature of red in saying that the words "Red exists" do not yield a sense. Namely that red does exist 'in its own right' [原文: an und für sich]. The same idea—that this is a metaphysical statement about red—finds expression again when we say such a thing as that red is timeless, and perhaps still more strongly in the word "indestructible".
　But what we really want is simply to take "Red exists" as the statement: the word "red" has a meaning. Or perhaps better: "Red does not exist" as " 'Red' has no meaning". Only we do not want to say that that expression says this, but that this is what it would have to be saying if it meant anything. But that it contradicts itself in the attempt to say it—just because red exists 'in its own right'. Whereas the only contradiction lies in something like this: the proposition looks as if it were about the colour, while it is supposed to be saying something about the use of the word "red".—In reality, however, we quite readily say that a particular colour exists; and that is as much as to say that something exists that has that colour. And the first expression is no less accurate than the second; particularly where 'what has the colour' is not a physical object.（英译来自Anscombe）

倪梁康：观念主义，还是语言主义？——对石里克、维特根斯坦与胡塞尔之间争论的追思http://www.cnphenomenology.com/modules/article/view.article.php/626
倪梁康：思者的疑虑
http://www.frchina.net/forumnew/forum-viewthread-action-printable-tid-93611.html