【每日哲学辞典】存在就是被感知

存在就是被感知（Esse est percipi）：[拉丁文，意思是“存在就是被感知“]它是英格兰-爱尔兰经验论者G.巴克莱的”主观唯心主义“或”非唯物论“的核心论点或先天根据。它断言，经验的普通对象当且仅当它们被知觉时才存在。因而，事物不可能独立于我们的心灵，它们就是对我们呈现的那样。对这个命题的主要论证如下：（1）每一物质对象都是可感性质的集合或联结；（2）每一可感性质都与感觉者相关，因而都是一个观念；（3）一个观念不可能没有我们的心灵或感觉而存在；（4）因此，每一物理对象都是各种观念的联结，它不能自身存在。不过，在你这个论证中，对前提（1）和（2）是有争论的。前提（1）带来的问题是，它否认了基础试题和表面偶性的传统区分。巴克莱试图驳斥实体或基质的概念，但除了对洛克的粗浅说明所作的反驳外，他并没有取得确切的成功。而且，他那个时代物理学所取得的成就似乎与他的论点相反。物理学证明，外借事物只有其内在的性质，并且是物理学规律的基础。为反对这一观点，巴克莱论证说，科学理论不是描述性恩典，而是论断性的。这一见解惊奇地得到了许多20世纪科学哲学家的响应。前提（2）带来的问题是，它否认了洛克关于第一性的质和第二性的质的区分。没有任何有力的论证表明第一性的质是以巴克莱所提出的方式与知觉者相关的。此外，观念作为被知觉到的东西，必定是被引起的，因而应当用其他的根据来说明。巴克莱否认观念是被外界对象引起的，并证明说，观念是由上帝引起的。对于“存在就是被感知”这一论点还有其他一些证明（包括“主论证”），但是，每一证明都面临严重的困难。一般而言，这个论点是站不住的，而且它没有很好地捍卫常识以反对怀疑主义，这本是巴克莱打算让它其的作用。不过，这个论点仍然有深刻的哲学意味。巴克莱的直接目的是否认被知觉的有形世界后面有任何不可知的东西存在。他的“感知”不应被理解成“我的偶然的感知”，而应理解成“感知本身”，我们或许可以合乎条理地想象一张桌子未被这个或那个人看到，但是我们若试图想象桌子根本未被看到，困难就出现了，近代现象论放弃了以巴克莱的说明为基础的上帝实际知觉论，而采取了一种可能知觉论，即在适当条件下，我们具有对于说明对象至关重要的可能知觉。

“因为所谓不思想的事物完全与它的被感知无关而由绝对的存在，似乎是完全无法理解的。它们的存在就是被感知，它们不可能再知觉它们的心灵或能思维的东西之外获得存在。”

——巴克莱：《人类知识原理》，第一章，第3节。

Esse est percipi：[Latin, to be is to beperceived]The central thesis or a priori ground forthesubjective idealism or immaterialism of theAnglo-Irish empiricist, George Berkeley. It claimsthat theordinary objects of experience exist if andonly if theyare perceived. Hence, things cannot beindependentof our minds and are what they appearto us to be.The major argument for this propositionis asfollows: (1) every corporeal object is acollection orassociation of sensible qualities; (2)everysensible quality is relative to the percipientand istherefore an idea; (3) an idea cannot existwithout ourmind or sensation; (4) hence everyphysicalobject is an association of ideas and cannotexist in itsown right. However, in this argument,premises (1)and (2) are controversial. The problemwith (1) isthat it denies the traditional distinctionbetweenunderlying substance andperipheralaccidents. Berkeley attempted to refute the notion ofsubstance or substratum, but with uncertain successexcept against Locke’s minimal account. Moreover,theachievements of physics in his time seemed toprove,contrary to his thesis, that external thingshave theirproperties intrinsically and are the basisfor the lawsof physics. Against this, Berkeley arguedthatscientific theories are not descriptive but predictive.This insightis surprisingly echoed by manytwentieth-century philosophersof science. The problemwith (2) is that it deniedLocke’s distinctionbetween primary qualities and secondary qualities.There is no strong argument to suggest that primaryqualities are relative to perceivers in the wayBerkeley suggested. Furthermore, ideas as thingsperceived must be caused, and should be accountedfor by another ground. Berkeley denied that theyare caused by external objects and argued that theyare caused by God. There are also other arguments(including the master argument) for the thesis essseest percepi, but each faces seriousdifficulties. In general,this thesis is ill founded,and does not constitutethe defense of common sense against skepticismthat Berkeley intended it to be. Nevertheless, it isofdeep philosophical interest. Berkeley’s direct objectis to deny the existence of anything unknowablebehind the perceived corporeal world. His sensingshould be understood not as my accidental sensing,but as sensing as such. We might be able to thinkcoherently of a table as not seen by this or thatman, but difficulties arise if we try to think of itasnot seen at all. Modern phenomenalism moves fromthe actualperceptions of God at the basis ofBerkeley’saccount to the possible perceptions thatwe wouldhave in appropriate circumstances ascrucial toour account of objects.

“For as towhat is said of the absolute existence ofunthinkingthings without any relation to theirbeingperceived, that seems perfectly unintelligible.Their esse is percipi, nor is itpossible theyshould have existence, out ofthe minds of thinkingthings which perceive them.”

——Berkeley,The Principles of Human Knowledge

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