Sunni-Shia strife
逊尼什叶之争
The sword and the word
剑与真言
In the struggle between the two strands of Islam, the Sunnis are on the rise
在伊斯兰教两大分支的冲突中，逊尼派开始占据上风
May 12th 2012 | from the print edition of The Economist
译者：nayilus
IT SEEMED historic. Muslim scholars, 170 in number and representing nine schools of legal thought (including four main Sunni ones and two Shia), gathered in Amman and declared that, whatever their differences, they accepted the others’ authority over their respective flocks. Implicitly, at least, they were renouncing the idea that their counterparts were heretics. Some called that meeting in Jordan in 2005 the biggest convergence since 969, when a Shia dynasty took over Egypt.
这听上去是一件历史性的大事。分别代表九大教法学派（包括四个主要的逊尼教派和两个什叶教派）的170名穆斯林学者共聚安曼，宣布他们会摒弃任何分歧，接受其他教派在各自教民中的权威地位。这至少隐约地表示他们将不再其他教派视为异端邪说。有人认为这次2005年在约旦的聚会是公元969年什叶王朝侵吞埃及之后伊斯兰教最大规模的一次汇聚。
Many of the globe-trotting greybeards who met there, and at a similar gathering in Qatar in 2007, remain actively and optimistically engaged. But seen from the outside, feuds between Sunnis, who make up roughly 80% of the world’s Muslims, and the Shia minority (most of the rest), remain savage and are, in some ways, worsening.
在那次会议，以及后来2007年在卡塔尔举行的另一次类似聚会上有很多在世界各地旅行传教的白须老人出席，他们对促进伊斯兰教不同教派的相容这一课题仍然保持着积极乐观的态度。但是从局外人的视角看来，占世界穆斯林大约80%的逊尼教徒和数量较少的什叶教徒（包括剩余的大多数穆斯林）之间的争斗仍然残忍血腥，而且从某些方面来看，情况正在恶化。
In conservative Sunni monarchies (especially those with restless Shia populations) dislike and suspicion of Iran, the Shia bastion, is running higher than ever. Theology intertwines with geopolitics—and an incipient strategic-arms race. Far beyond the Gulf or Middle East, from western Europe to North America, Sunni agitation (often Saudi-sponsored) is intensifying against the supposed heresies contained in Shia teaching.
在保守的逊尼派君主国内（尤其是那些国内有着焦躁不满的什叶群体的国家），对什叶派的大本营伊朗的厌恶和怀疑现在正达到历史最高点。这些国家内的神学和地域政治被混合在一起，而战略军备竞争的迹象也逐渐浮现。而在远离波斯湾和中东地区，从西欧到北美，逊尼派受到日益强烈的煽动（很多由沙特出资），正在变得越来越抵触什叶教统内所谓的异端邪说。
Belgian police are investigating the firebombing of Belgium’s biggest Shia mosque in March, which killed the imam. The suspect they arrested claims to be a Salafist (hardline Sunni) protesting against Shia backing for the Syrian regime. Grieving worshippers chanted Shia slogans at the scene, eerily echoing far bloodier incidents in places such as Pakistan (recent examples include a murderous grenade assault on a Sunni demonstration in April and an attack on a bus in February that killed 18 Shia passengers).
今年3月比利时最大一间什叶派清真寺发生的炸弹袭击致使一名伊玛目丧生。比利时警方正在调查该案。他们逮捕的疑犯据称是一位萨拉菲斯特教徒（强硬派逊尼分支），目的是为了抗议什叶派支持叙利亚政府当局。在罪案现场哀悼的信徒们念诵着什叶口号，仿佛把人带到了在诸如巴基斯坦等地那些远为血腥的袭击事件现场一样，令人心惊胆战。（最近的此类袭击包括4月针对一次逊尼游行的残暴手榴弹袭击，以及2月造成18名什叶乘客丧生的一次公交车袭击）。
European Shia-Sunni acrimony is part of a many-sided contest over the future of the continent’s tens of millions of Muslims, says Jonathan Laurence, a scholar at Boston College. The religious authorities in migrant-sending countries like Turkey and Morocco struggle to keep their people loyal to their own varieties of Sunni practice: they see Shia Islam and hardline Sunni groups like the Salafists as equally dangerous and insidious temptations for their sons and daughters in Europe.
波士顿学院的学者乔纳森·劳伦斯认为欧洲地区的什叶－逊尼仇视现象是攸关欧洲数千万穆斯林未来的多方面冲突的一部分。土耳其和摩洛哥就是两个向欧洲输送大批穆斯林移民的国家例子。这类国家国内的宗教领袖在勉力尝试让人民忠于自己的逊尼教统：他们认为什叶派伊斯兰教和像是萨拉菲斯特这样的强硬逊尼集团对他们远走欧洲的教民们来说都是一种诱惑，两者同样的危险，也同样在对教民潜移默化。
Strife even reaches places like South-East Asia where few Shias live. Malaysia has presented itself to the world as a tolerant Muslim-majority state. But it bans the preaching of Shia Islam, with particular ferocity since December 2010, when dozens of Shias were arrested. They say they were merely practising their faith (which is legally allowed), not preaching it.
教派的冲突甚至一直延展到什叶教徒很少的东南亚。马来西亚呈现给世界的是一个穆斯林占大多数人口的包容性国家。但是马来西亚却禁止什叶派伊斯兰教传道，而且在2010年12月当局进行了大规模行动，逮捕了几十名什叶教徒。这些教徒声称他们只是在举行什叶宗教活动（这是合法的），而并没有在进行传教。
Yusuf al-Qaradawi, a Qatar-based preacher often described as the de facto spiritual guide of the Muslim Brotherhood, has recently kept up a barrage of verbal attacks on the Shias. He is president of the International Union for Muslim Scholars, a loose Brotherhood-inspired body designed to pronounce on issues of common concern to Muslims. Founded in the friendlier climate of 2004, its top ranks also include Shia clergy.
卡塔尔的传道师尤素夫·阿尔·卡拉达维经常被描述为穆斯林兄弟会实际上的精神领导人。他最近连续对什叶派发表了大量言论攻击。他同时也是国际穆斯林学者联合会的主席，这个受兄弟会启发的开放性组织其建立初衷在于就穆斯林共同相关的一些问题进行发言。该组织建于2004年，当时教内的气氛较为友好，该组织的上层也包括了什叶派教职人员。
One God, many arguments
一个真主，许多论点
But Mr Qaradawi now attacks Shias for compromising the oneness of God (about the worst thing a Muslim can do) by ascribing semi-divine status to the people they regard as Muhammad’s legitimate successors. Another accusation is that Shias poach souls in Sunni lands.
但恰恰是卡拉达维现在开始攻击什叶派，指什叶派把有些人看作是穆罕默德的合法继承者，赋予其半神的地位，从而削弱了真主的唯一性（这大概是穆斯林所能犯的最严重罪行了）。另外一项谴责则是什叶派人士在逊尼派土地上挖角信徒。
Time was when Mr Qaradawi praised the feats of Hizbullah, the Iranian-backed Shia militia in Lebanon, as fighters against Israel. But in recent punditry he has stressed the gap between Sunni and Shia beliefs and passionately called for regime change in Syria, where, among other things, a Sunni majority is rebelling against a ruling elite whose Alawite belief (see table) is a Shia offshoot. Senior Shia clergy have deplored his hardening line. Mr Qaradawi, whose utterances command attention from Marseilles to the north Caucasus, also backs Bahrain’s Sunni rulers in their anti-Shia stance.
过去，卡拉达维曾经赞扬过黎巴嫩真主党这一伊朗支持下的黎巴嫩什叶军事集团，称他们是对抗以色列的战士。但今时不同往日，他最近发表的评论强调了逊尼和什叶信仰之间的鸿沟，并且慷慨激昂地呼吁叙利亚政府下台。在叙利亚有很多问题，其中之一就是当政的上层阶级信仰什叶分支的阿拉维派（见表），而全国大部份揭竿起义的人民却是逊尼派。一些资深的什叶教职人员强烈谴责了卡拉达维强硬的措辞。而言论影响力西至马赛，东至北高加索地带的卡拉达维同时却也支持巴林的逊尼统治者所持的反什叶立场。
Paradoxically enough, one reason for the worsening in intra-Muslim relations is the declining role of the West. At the time of the Amman gathering in 2005, Iraq was in the grip both of horrific Sunni-Shia violence and of American occupation. It was possible to convince ordinary Muslims (however unfairly) that America was to blame for stoking this tension; and that, for dignity’s sake, followers of Islam should stand together against the outsiders’ game of divide-and-rule. Now the American occupation of Iraq is over, and hatred between Sunnis and Shias there has a ghastly momentum of its own: the Shia prime minister, Nuri al-Maliki, has accused a Sunni vice-president, Tariq al-Hashemi, of complicity in terrorism and forced him to flee. On April 30th he was charged with multiple murders.
这么说可能有点自相矛盾，但是穆斯林内部关系恶化的一个原因在于西方扮演的角色影响力正在式微。在2005年的安曼大会上，伊拉克正处于可怕的逊尼－什叶暴动以及美国占领之中。当时宗教领袖可以说服普通穆斯林，让他们相信一切都是美国在背后煽风点火（尽管这么说有欠公道），为了伊斯兰教的尊严，所有的教徒应该万众一心，抵制外来者的分化策略。现在美国对伊拉克的占领已经结束，而伊拉克境内的逊尼什叶仇恨则依然保持着可怕的势头——什叶派总理努里·马利基日前谴责逊尼派副总统塔里克·哈希米，指他和恐怖分子合谋，并迫使他出逃。4月30日哈希米被控数桩谋杀罪名。
But perhaps the biggest change is that Sunnis think they are now winning the global contest. Seven years ago it seemed that Shia Islam, whether in Iran, Iraq and Lebanon, was on the march. Hot-headed Sunnis who yearned to see a government or movement that would confront Israel in the name of Islam had to find role-models across the sectarian divide, in Iran, or in the mullahs’ Lebanese protégés in Hizbullah.
但是现在和当初相比最大的变化可能在于逊尼派认为自己正在全球冲突中占据上风。七年前，似乎什叶派风头大好，不管是在伊朗、伊拉克还是在黎巴嫩都有上升趋势。当时那些鲁莽好斗，渴望自己的政府或组织能以伊斯兰之名对抗以色列的逊尼派教徒不得不跨过教派分界线，在什叶派的伊朗或是黎巴嫩真主党的毛拉学徒中寻找楷模。
These days zealous Sunnis need no longer look to swashbuckling Shias for inspiration. The real action is unfolding in their own homelands, at least in north Africa or the Levant. Nor need they look abroad for political ideology: the Arab spring has established the Sunni sort of political Islam as a powerful, domestically based force that has emerged from the underground or from exile. Rachid Ghannouchi, for example, Tunisia’s best-known Islamist, has returned from London to become probably the most powerful figure in the land. Vali Nasr, a professor at the Fletcher School of Tufts University in America and a former adviser to the Obama administration, says that—rightly or wrongly—Sunnis believe that Western sanctions are weakening Iran, and that the combined efforts of Sunnis and the West will also topple Iran’s only Arab ally, Syria. From a Sunni perspective, these impending victories outweigh the travails of their co-religionists in majority-Shia Iraq.
而今时今日狂热的逊尼教徒不再需要在态度嚣张的什叶派中寻求鼓舞了。真正的大行动都发生在他们自己的土地上，至少在北非和黎凡特地区正是如此。他们不需要在国外寻找政治意识形态：逊尼派的政治伊斯兰教在阿拉伯之春中从地下和海外冒出头来，成为了一支强大，以本土为据点的力量。例如，突尼斯最知名的伊斯兰分子拉希德·加努希从伦敦归来，成为了突尼斯最有权势的人物。塔夫斯大学佛莱契学院教授，奥巴马当局前顾问瓦利·纳斯尔认为逊尼派相信（是否正确先撇开不顾）西方的经济制裁正在削弱伊朗，而逊尼派和西方力量联合起来将会推翻伊朗在阿拉伯的唯一同盟叙利亚。从逊尼派的观点来看，这些即将到来的胜利远远盖过了他们的教友在什叶教徒占大多数的伊拉克所遭遇的痛苦。
Intra-Muslim relations are not universally bleak. An Iraqi adaptation of “Romeo and Juliet”, featuring star-crossed love across the Muslim sectarian divide (rather than the clan loyalties of Verona), has won acclaim there, and was performed at the World Shakespeare Festival in Stratford-upon-Avon. Egypt’s handful of Shias, a nervous bunch, have declared support for a Muslim Brotherhood (in other words, Sunni) presidential candidate. In campaigns for freedom and justice in the Middle East, Sunni-Shia distinctions can melt away. “We are all part of the same struggle,” says Maryam al-Khawaja, an activist from Bahrain’s aggrieved Shia majority. She co-starred this week with Sunnis like Manal al-Sharif, a Saudi woman detained for defying that country’s ban on women driving, at the Oslo Freedom Forum, a lively get-together for foes of state oppression.
穆斯林内部关系的前景并不完全黑暗。伊拉克上演了一出《罗密欧与茱丽叶》的改编剧，剧中命运多舛的两名恋人来自穆斯林的两大敌对教派（而不是来自维罗纳的名门望族）。该剧赢得了多方的赞誉，并在斯特拉福德的世界莎士比亚节上演出。埃及的少数什叶教徒尽管感到紧张不安，还是宣布他们会支持穆斯林兄弟会（换句话说也就是逊尼派）的总统候选人。在中东为了自由和公义的运动中，逊尼－什叶之间的分歧可以消融。什叶派在巴林占大多数人口却倍受欺压，该派的活动分子玛丽亚姆·卡瓦加说道：“我们都是同一场斗争中的各部份”。她本周在奥斯论自由剧场登台演出，和她一起出场的还有一批逊尼派人士，包括来自沙特，曾因为违反该国女性不得开车禁令而被拘禁的玛那尔·沙里夫。这是一场生气勃勃的对抗国家压迫者聚会。
Historic compromises between ancient rivals are most likely either when both sides acknowledge a stalemate, or else when some outsider forces them together. State repression may do that sometimes—but it is a sad and slender hope for those who yearn for intra-Muslim accord.
一直以来的对手之间要达成历史性的妥协，最有可能的情况就是双方都意识到已陷于僵局，或者外来力量迫使其妥协。国家压迫偶尔可能会起到这个作用，但这对于那些渴望教内和平的人来说是一个既悲哀又渺茫的希望。
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