期刊简介
《国际安全》（International Security）是国际关系和国际安全研究领域的顶级期刊，成立于1976年，由哈佛大学贝尔弗科学与国际事务中心（Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs）资助，麻省理工学院出版社出版。据期刊引证报告（Journal Citation Reports）统计，其影响因子（impact factor）一直高居国际关系领域前五。2019年，该刊在国际关系领域排名第一。
本期目录
1. 预测与判断：为什么人工智能增加了人类在战争中的重要性
Prediction and Judgment: Why Artificial Intelligence Increases the Importance of Humans in War
2. 保卫美国：重新审视针对朝鲜的国家导弹防御系统
Defending the United States: Revisiting National Missile Defense against North Korea
3. 起义军：胜利后的军事服从和国家组织
Insurgent Armies: Military Obedience and State Formation after Rebel Victory
4. 评估中美意外的核升级
Assessing China-U.S. Inadvertent Nuclear Escalation
5. 永别了，武器?选举结果与内战后的持久和平
A Farewell to Arms? Election Results and Lasting Peace after Civil War
预测与判断：为什么人工智能增加了人类在战争中的重要性
题目：Prediction and Judgment: Why Artificial Intelligence Increases the Importance of Humans in War
作者：Avi Goldfarb, （罗特曼人工智能和医疗保健讲座教授，多伦多大学教授，国家经济研究局助理研究员），Jon R. Lindsay（佐治亚理工学院网络安全与隐私学院副教授，山姆纳恩国际事务学院副院长）
摘要：最近关于人工智能（AI）和国际安全的学术研究集中在用机器取代人类战士的政治和伦理后果上。然而，人工智能并不是人类决策的简单替代品。商业机器学习的进步降低了统计预测的成本，同时也增加了数据（使预测成为可能）和判断（决定预测为何重要）的价值。但是，在不确定和冲突的战争中，这些关键的补充可能不存在高质量的数据和明确的判断，或在相同程度上不存在。这有两个重要的战略意义。第一，采用人工智能的军事组织往往会变得更加复杂，以适应各种决策任务中数据和判断的挑战。第二，在战略竞争中，数据和判断往往会成为有吸引力的目标。因此，涉及人工智能互补的冲突可能会与人工智能替代的愿景截然不同。与快速的机器人战争和军事力量的决定性转变不同，人工智能的冲突可能会涉及重大的不确定性、组织摩擦和长期的争议。因此，军事上对人工智能的更大依赖将使人类因素在战争中变得更重要，而不是更不重要。
Recent scholarship on artificial intelligence (AI) and international security focuses on the political and ethical consequences of replacing human warriors with machines. Yet AI is not a simple substitute for human decision-making. The advances in commercial machine learning that are reducing the costs of statistical prediction are simultaneously increasing the value of data (which enable prediction) and judgment (which determines why prediction matters). But these key complements—quality data and clear judgment—may not be present, or present to the same degree, in the uncertain and conflictual business of war. This has two important strategic implications. First, military organizations that adopt AI will tend to become more complex to accommodate the challenges of data and judgment across a variety of decision-making tasks. Second, data and judgment will tend to become attractive targets in strategic competition. As a result, conflicts involving AI complements are likely to unfold very differently than visions of AI substitution would suggest. Rather than rapid robotic wars and decisive shifts in military power, AI-enabled conflict will likely involve significant uncertainty, organizational friction, and chronic controversy. Greater military reliance on AI will therefore make the human element in war even more important, not less.
保卫美国：重新审视针对朝鲜的国家导弹防御系统
题目：Defending the United States: Revisiting National Missile Defense against North Korea
作者：Jaganath Sankaran（德克萨斯大学奥斯汀分校约翰逊公共事务学院助理教授）, Steve Fetter（马里兰大学公共政策学院的教授）
摘要：朝鲜在试图获得战略核威慑方面取得了重大进展。2017年，它测试了洲际弹道导弹（ICBMs），并完成了一系列核试验爆炸。这些可能为朝鲜部署能够打击美国的搭载核弹头的洲际弹道导弹提供技术基础。陆基中段防御（GMD）导弹防御系统的目的是威慑朝鲜的核胁迫，如果威慑失败，可以挫败朝鲜的有限攻击。然而，尽管经过了二十年的努力和昂贵的代价，GMD系统仍然未经证实和不可靠。它还没有表现出有能力击败朝鲜可以采取的相对简单和廉价的对抗措施。20世纪90年代出于政治动机匆忙部署，GMD系统遭受了持续的延迟、大量的成本增加和反复的计划失败。但是，GMD和美国其他导弹防御系统的努力引起了俄罗斯和中国的严重关切，他们担心这可能威胁到他们的核威慑力量。外交和威慑可以在限制朝鲜核计划的同时安抚俄罗斯和中国。另一种机载助推级拦截系统可能提供有意义的防御朝鲜导弹，而不会威胁到俄罗斯或中国的威慑力量。
North Korea has made significant strides in its attempt to acquire a strategic nuclear deterrent. In 2017, it tested intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and completed a series of nuclear test explosions. These may provide North Korea with the technical foundation to deploy a nuclear-armed ICBM capable of striking the United States. The Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) missile defense system is intended to deter North Korean nuclear coercion and, if deterrence fails, to defeat a limited North Korean attack. Despite two decades of dedicated and costly efforts, however, the GMD system remains unproven and unreliable. It has not demonstrated an ability to defeat the relatively simple and inexpensive countermeasures that North Korea can field. The GMD system has suffered persistent delays, substantial cost increases, and repeated program failures because of the politically motivated rush to deploy in the 1990s. But GMD and other U.S. missile defense efforts have provoked serious concerns in Russia and China, who fear it may threaten their nuclear deterrents. Diplomacy and deterrence may reassure Russia and China while constraining North Korea's nuclear program. An alternate airborne boost-phase intercept system may offer meaningful defense against North Korean missiles without threatening the Russian or Chinese deterrents.
起义军：胜利后的军事服从和国家组织
题目：Insurgent Armies: Military Obedience and State Formation after Rebel Victory
作者：Philip A. Martin（乔治梅森大学政策与政府学院国际安全助理教授）
摘要：为什么一些取得胜利的叛军组织在内战后建立了顺从而有效的国家军队，而另一些组织却遭遇了军事叛变？在内战期间，获胜的反政府武装面临着严重的安全威胁，在战争到和平的过渡期间，反政府武装的战地指挥官更有可能保持服从。强烈的安全威胁促使武装分子建立更具包容性的领导结构，从而降低了战场指挥官在战后时期叛变的动机。强烈的安全威胁也降低了指挥官在战后抵抗的能力，因为这迫使叛乱分子保持机动，并缩短了在叛乱分子控制地区的时间，从而降低了战地指挥官发展地方关系和独立支持基地的可能性。用一份1946年以来获胜的反叛组织的新名单来检验这一论点的合理性。津巴布韦和科特迪瓦的两个案例研究探讨了该理论的因果机制。该研究有助于讨论内战中军事胜利的后果、战后武装组织的发展轨迹，以及脆弱国家军民团结的必要条件。
Why do some winning rebel groups build obedient and effective state militaries after civil war, while others suffer military defections? When winning rebels face intense security threats during civil wars, rebel field commanders are more likely to remain obedient during war-to-peace transitions. Intense security threats incentivize militants to create more inclusive leadership structures, reducing field commanders’ incentives to defect in the postwar period. Intense security threats also reduce commanders’ capacity for postwar resistance by forcing insurgents to remain mobile and adopt shorter time horizons in rebel-governed territory, reducing the likelihood that field commanders will develop local ties and independent support bases. The plausibility of the argument is examined using a new list of winning rebel groups since 1946. Two case studies—Zimbabwe and Côte d'Ivoire—probe the causal mechanisms of the theory. The study contributes to debates about the consequences of military victory in civil war, the postwar trajectories of armed groups, and the conditions necessary for civil-military cohesion in fragile states.
评估中美意外的核升级
题目：Assessing China-U.S. Inadvertent Nuclear Escalation
作者：吴日强（中国人民大学国际关系学院副教授）
摘要：中美意外的升级一直是最近国际关系文献的一个焦点。然而，目前的争论没有充分重视两个重要因素：中国核力量在非故意常规攻击下的生存能力；核指挥控制通信系统。在对这两个变量进行详细分析的基础上，提出中美经贸合作的三个潜在机制。检查意外升级:使用或丢失、未经授权/意外以及损害限制。虽然中美关系可能会出现重大转折。常规战争不小心升级到核水平不能排除，风险极低。中国的核力量将在美国意外的常规攻击中幸存下来，因此，不太可能受到显著削弱。即使在与美国的常规战争中，中国的NC3系统可能会降级，但中国领导层可能会与核力量保持最低限度的紧急通信。此外，中国的NC3系统高度集中，优先进行负控制，有助于防止事态升级。中国的核报复能力虽然有限，但可能会在一定程度上阻碍美国限制损害的打击。为了降低意外升级的风险，双方必须采取适当的预防措施，在规划和行动中保持自我克制。
China-U.S. inadvertent escalation has been a focus of recent international relations literature. The current debate, however, has not paid sufficient attention to two important factors: the survivability of China's nuclear forces under unintentional conventional attacks; and China's nuclear command, control, and communication (NC3) system. Based on detailed analysis of these two variables, three potential mechanisms of China-U.S. inadvertent escalation are examined: use-it-or-lose-it, unauthorized/accidental, and damage-limitation. Although the possibility of a major China-U.S. conventional war inadvertently escalating to a nuclear level cannot be excluded, the risk is extremely low. China's nuclear forces would survive U.S. inadvertent conventional attacks and, thus, are unlikely to be significantly undermined. Even though China's NC3 system might be degraded during a conventional war with the United States, Chinese leadership would likely maintain minimum emergency communications with its nuclear forces. Moreover, China's NC3 system is highly centralized, and it prioritizes “negative control,” which can help to prevent escalation. China's nuclear retaliatory capability, although limited, could impede U.S. damage-limitation strikes to some extent. To keep the risk of inadvertent escalation low, both sides must take appropriate precautions and exercise self-restraint in their planning and operations.
永别了，武器?选举结果与内战后的持久和平
题目：A Farewell to Arms? Election Results and Lasting Peace after Civil War
作者：Sarah Zukerman Daly（哥伦比亚大学政治学助理教授）
摘要：为什么在一些国内冲突之后战争会再次发生，而在其他冲突之后和平会巩固？未经检验的传统观点认为，战后选举缺乏保障措施对和平是危险的，因为选举失败者将拒绝接受选举结果，并重新军事化。关于战后选举结果的新的跨国数据和关于重新军事化的交战级数据都表明了这一观点。公民倾向于选择和平，因为他们参与了安全投票；他们选择他们认为最能保障国家安全的政党，用战争的结果作为指导他们安全投票的启发式。研究结果表明，如果战后军事力量平衡出现反转，战争败者在选举中表现不佳，那么重新爆发战争的可能性就会增加。相反，如果相对军事实力保持稳定，或者公民准确地更新了他们对战后权力平衡的理解，内战参与者在选举失败后就不太可能重新军事化。了解这些好战的选举参与者在何时以及如何选择维持或破坏和平，有助于就如何利用民主的好处，同时降低其风险展开重要的理论和政策辩论。
Why does fighting recur after some civil conflicts, whereas peace consolidates following others? The untested conventional wisdom is that—absent safeguards—postwar elections are dangerous for peace because electoral losers will reject the election results and remilitarize. New cross-national data on postwar election results and belligerent-level data on remilitarization contest this view. Citizens tend to elect peace because they engage in “security voting”; they elect the party that they deem best able to secure the state, using the war outcome as the heuristic that guides their security vote. Findings indicate that the chance of renewed war increases if there is an inversion in the military balance of power after war, and the war-loser performs poorly in the elections. If, instead, relative military power remains stable, or citizens accurately update their understandings of the postwar power balance, a civil war actor is unlikely to remilitarize if it loses the election. Knowing when and how these belligerent electoral actors choose to either sustain or break the peace informs important theoretical and policy debates on how to harness democracy's benefits while mitigating its risks.
编译 | 丁伟航
排版 | 屈媛媛 王佳怡
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